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Rumination is a recurrent and repetitive manner of thinking that can be triggered by
blockage of personally relevant goals, creating a temporary state of abstract and
evaluative self-focus. Particularly when focused on passive “brooding” over one’s
problems and feelings, however, rumination can increase negative affect, interfere
with problem-solving, and, through a negative feedback cycle, become a chronic
trait-like style of responding to personal challenges, particularly in women. Given
the pervasiveness of rumination and its potential impact on cognitive processes and
emotional states, the present study asks how it impacts attention to feedback that
either reminds individuals of goal-state discrepancies (reminders of errors) or could help
to remediate them (corrective information). Using eye-tracking, we examined both state
and trait rumination effects on overt measures of attention [first fixation duration (FFD)
and total fixation duration (TFD)] during simultaneous presentation of these two types
of feedback following failed attempts to answer challenging verbal general knowledge
questions (average accuracy ∼30%). After a pre-induction baseline, we induced either
a state of rumination using a series of writing exercises centered on the description
of an unresolved academic concern or a state of distraction by centering writing on
the description of a neutral school day. Within our women-only sample, the Rumination
condition, which writing analysis showed was dominated by moody brooding, resulted
in some evidence for increased initial dwell time (FFD) on reminders of incorrect answers,
while the Distraction condition, which did not elicit any rumination during writing, resulted
in increased FFD on the correct answer. Trait brooding augmented the expression of
the more negative, moody brooding content in the writing samples of both Induction
conditions, but only influenced TFD measures of gaze duration and only during the
pre-induction baseline, suggesting that once the inductions activated rumination or
distraction states, these suppressed the trait effects in this sample. These results provide
some support for attentional-bias models of rumination (attentional scope model,
impaired disengagement hypothesis) and have implications for how even temporary
states of rumination or distraction might impact processing of academic feedback under
conditions of challenge and failure.
Keywords: eye-tracking, gaze, brooding, reflection, feedback, fixation, RRS

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

1

September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 2094

Whiteman and Mangels

Rumination and Attention to Feedback

and external attention to the error itself, rather than on
remediating the error by focusing on corrective information (see
also Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow, 1991; Siegle et al., 2002;
Moberly and Watkins, 2010).

INTRODUCTION
Rumination is a recurrent and repetitive manner of thinking
that can be triggered by blockage of personally relevant goals,
creating a temporary state of abstract and evaluative selffocus that can eventually lead to a more chronic, trait-like
style of ruminative responding to personal challenges (Watkins
and Nolen-Hoeksema, 2014). Prominent models of rumination
[Martin and Tesser’s (1996) Control Theory; Nolen-Hoeksema’s
(1987) Response Styles Theory] describe both temporary (state)
and chronic (trait) rumination as being maladaptive for both
affect and goal-directed behavior (for a review, see NolenHoeksema et al., 2008). This is particularly the case for the
Ruminative Brooding (RB) subtype, which produces a sustained,
but unproductive focus of attention on negative outcomes and
their associated feelings. In contrast, the Reflective Pondering
subtype is proposed to be more adaptive in nature because it
taps the tendency to deliberately “reflect” on concrete means for
problem solving (Treynor et al., 2003).
To date, few studies have examined the effects of either
ruminative subtype within an academically relevant context (e.g.,
Lyubomirsky et al., 2003; Ciarocco et al., 2010). This is surprising
given that students may face various types of cognitive and
affective challenges during difficult performance assessments. For
example, rumination is purported to underlie the detrimental
social-cognitive phenomenon of stereotype threat (Beilock et al.,
2007). The present study aims to address this gap in knowledge,
specifically by examining how inducing a state of broodingfocused rumination in students influences selective attention
to negative feedback during a challenging general-knowledge
retrieval task (e.g., “What is the capital of Canada?”; Butterfield
and Mangels, 2003; Whiteman and Mangels, 2016; Mangels et al.,
2018). Here, we enlisted eye-tracking gaze metrics to examine
how reminding individuals of past unattained academic goals
through a narrative expression exercise (rumination induction)
influenced selective attention to reminders of retrieval errors
during the task. Specifically, we used fixation dwell time
to evaluate selective attention when the correct answer was
presented simultaneously and thus in competition with reminders
of one’s recent mistake.
In their habit-goal framework of rumination, Watkins and
Nolen-Hoeksema (2014) argue that it is not only internal events
(e.g., negative affect experienced during bouts of dysphoria or
depression) that can trigger rumination but also external events
that are construed as impediments to goal attainment (e.g.,
negative environments, locations, and/or behaviors of others).
Similarly, social-cognitive theories of rumination argue that
bringing one’s immediate and personal goal-state discrepancies
into awareness can cause momentary ruminative thoughts to
come online and attention to be deployed toward related,
self-relevant content, even among otherwise mentally healthy
individuals (Martin and Tesser, 1996; Moberly and Watkins,
2008). Thus, if someone is already in a state of rumination,
primed by reminders of past goal-state discrepancies, then
receiving repeated negative feedback regarding task performance
could be just the type of external event that might trigger
maladaptive attentional patterns associated with greater internal
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Using Narrative Expression to Induce
Rumination
Roberts et al. (2013) found that instructions for research
participants to dwell on an ongoing, real-world concern of theirs
resulted in more ruminative thoughts about their concern during
an unrelated go/no-go task than those who were instructed
to focus on a resolved goal. As in Roberts et al. (2013), the
current study asks students to initially identify their unresolved
academic concerns but, unlike that study, then prompts them to
descriptively write about (i.e., externally narrate) their concerns,
thus adapting methodology used in expressive writing paradigms
(e.g., Pennebaker, 1997; McAdams and McLean, 2013). The use
of expressive writing provides a means for explicitly measuring
whether participants are actively processing the state induction
prompts and, furthermore, to quantify thoughts according to
whether they are more brooding-like or more reflective in nature
(Marin and Rotondo, 2017). In keeping with typical expressive
writing methods, we pit expressive narration against a nonexpressive condition in which individuals offer neutral narrations
about how they spend a typical day in their schedule (e.g., Gortner
et al., 2006; Sloan et al., 2008). Neutrally writing about a mundane
daily routine creates an ideal comparison condition because it,
similarly, focuses attention on an autobiographical episode in the
academic domain, while at the same time keeping focus away
from specific academic concerns.
Narrative expression can provide direct insight into
participants’ thoughts and feelings, but not without the
caveat that formulating and transmitting a coherent narrative
to others may influence the framing of the situation itself. Past
studies using expressive writing have yielded mixed outcomes
for well-being and problem-solving in intervention-based
studies (for a review, see Frattaroli, 2006). On the one hand,
expressive writing can be a helpful, adaptive process and, by
promoting self-affirmation through positive self-reflection (SR)
and constructive meaning-making (e.g., Banks and Salmon, 2013;
Cohen and Sherman, 2014), can offer writers an opportunity to
confront, organize, and insightfully restructure their ongoing
problems and issues (Lyubomirsky et al., 2006). Indeed, in
some studies that use this kind of prompting, expressive writing
has been shown to actually reduce rumination (Gortner et al.,
2006; Sloan et al., 2008) and improve performance on exams
(Ramirez and Beilock, 2011).
On the other hand, expressive writing can also be maladaptive,
particularly when it is characterized more by unconstructive
reasoning processes (Banks and Salmon, 2013), which instead
focus writers’ attention on negative abstractions of the causes
and undesirable consequences of their problems and prime
more critical views of the self and fixed views of the situation
(Lilgendahl et al., 2013). Not surprisingly, this latter style of
expressive writing would seem to exemplify what it means to
brood. Importantly, Marin and Rotondo (2017) have shown that
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study found that individuals who exhibited stable trait Brooding
both at the time of study and over the course of the following year
not only were slower to disengage attentional focus away from
negative information but also were slower to engage attention
with more positive stimuli (Allard and Yaroslavsky, 2019).
Given that habitual, trait-like forms of rumination may
arise from repeated experience of more temporary states of
rumination (Watkins and Nolen-Hoeksema, 2014), we might
expect to observe similar patterns of attentional bias when
individuals are temporarily induced to experience a ruminative
state. To test this in the context of our academically relevant
task, we presented trial-level feedback following attempts to
answer general knowledge questions (e.g., What is the capital of
Canada?) that consisted of an initial, centrally presented small
circle colored to indicate response accuracy (red for incorrect,
green for correct), followed by “competitive” answer feedback.
Critically, if the participant’s answer was wrong, this competitive
feedback would show the incorrect answer (e.g., Toronto) in red
simultaneously with the correct answer (e.g., Ottawa) presented
in gray, separated into the upper and lower halves of the
screen such that they could not be fixated simultaneously (if
the participant was correct, both halves would show the correct
answer, with one in green, the other in gray).
During this competitive feedback, we predicted that following
errors, participants induced into a state of rumination would
demonstrate increased dwell time on reminders of their incorrect
answer, compared to individuals induced to distract themselves
away from academic concerns. Furthermore, attention to the
reminder of the incorrect answer, which is informationally
redundant with the initially presented accuracy feedback (i.e., red
circle), could come at the cost of decreased dwell time to the
simultaneously presented, but more informative correct answer.
With regard to measuring dwell time, we used both TFD and first
fixation duration (FFD). Although TFD is the more commonly
used method in eye-tracking studies of rumination with faces
(e.g., Owens and Gibb, 2017), given that the competitive answer
feedback involved verbal stimuli, FFD may be better at isolating
the participants’ initial lexical/semantic processing of the answers
(Rayner and Duffy, 1986). In contrast, TFDs would inform the
extent to which the participant fixed on the answers well after the
meaning of those words had been acquired and potentially after
exploring other parts of the display as well.

the extent to which one’s expressive writing typifies brooding-like
rumination rather than SR is linked with lower self-acceptance
and more negative views of the self. Thus, it is conceivable
that being prompted to write in such a way about an ongoing
and unresolved academic (vs. being prompted to write about a
typical day in one’s schedule) could bring about a brooding-like
ruminative state that keeps attention negatively focused on the
self and signals of one’s failures.

Measuring the Effect of Rumination on
Selective Attention to Negative
Feedback
Past research has shown that trait Rumination is associated
to a narrowed attentional focus onto negative, self-relevant
information (Donaldson et al., 2007; Altamirano et al., 2010),
as well as difficulty inhibiting and disengaging from negative
information (Vanderhasselt et al., 2011), possibly because of
repeated introspection on the perceived self-relevance of this
material (Berman et al., 2010). With focus directed inwardly on
negative self-referential thoughts, ruminators are less likely to
retrieve potentially useful information during problem solving
(Bernblum and Mor, 2010), or to process new, surrounding
information (Levens et al., 2009). To explain these and other
similar findings, various theories of attentional bias have been
proposed, including the attentional scope model (Whitmer and
Gotlib, 2013) and impaired disengagement hypothesis (Koster
et al., 2011). In particular, the latter hypothesis suggests that
negatively brooding over goal-state discrepancies impairs the
ability to disengage attention from such troubles, at the expense
of deploying attention elsewhere.
One way to explicitly measure how attention might be biased
toward information that is perceived to be negative and/or selfrelevant is through eye-tracking measures. Eye-tracking provides
a direct and continuous measure of overt attention to visual
stimuli by measuring exactly where individuals are looking (i.e.,
fixating their gaze) and for how long. Although this method
can be particularly useful for informing questions regarding
attention selection across multiple stimuli (see Armstrong and
Olatunji, 2012), to date, only a few gaze fixation studies have been
conducted for expressly studying the attentional mechanisms
of rumination, and these have focused exclusively on trait
rather than state forms of rumination (Duque et al., 2014;
Owens and Gibb, 2017).
These findings implicate trait rumination in creating a
maladaptive attentional bias toward negative stimuli, one that
may serve to reinforce a ruminative, depressive mood. For
example, Duque et al. (2014) found that higher trait rumination
predicted a greater negative attentional bias in a free viewing
study (i.e., more time spent processing sad and angry faces,
but not neutral or happy faces), as measured by “total fixation
duration” metric [i.e., TFD; the summed amount of time spent
fixating an area of interest (AOI) while it is presented on-screen],
even after controlling for depression. Similarly, Owens and Gibb
(2017) found that greater brooding-like ruminative tendencies
within a mentally healthy adult sample predicted increased dwell
time on sad vs. happy faces. Interestingly, a recent eye-tracking
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Study Summary
In summary, the present study examined whether being induced
to ruminate vs. distract impacts overt attention to competitive
answer feedback in challenging general knowledge task, as
measured by TFD and FFD. Using a novel induction task
that was based on narrative expression, we hypothesized that
participants who had been induced to think about an unresolved
academic concern (i.e., Rumination condition) would be biased
to dwell longer on potentially “rumination-congruent” reminders
of the incorrect responses than individuals whose narratives
had been directed to focus on a neutral, average day (i.e.,
Distraction condition). Additionally, greater attention to the
incorrect answer might come at the cost of attention to the correct
answer, despite the latter’s greater information value.
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Induction condition) did not have a minimum number of
usable eye-tracking trials (minimum = 3; Chua et al., 2012) in
one or more conditions after pre-processing to remove trials
with excessive signal loss or initial central fixation failure (see
section “Eye Tracking” for details), necessitating their removal
from the eye-tracking analyses, although they were retained for
behavioral analysis. Exclusion of these subjects resulted in 55
subjects for behavioral analysis and 51 subjects for the eyetracking analysis.
Table 1 shows the distribution of these participants across
Induction conditions, as well as their group characteristics. For
both analysis groups, there were no condition differences in
BDI-II scores, or in trait levels of rumination as measured
by either the overall Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS;
Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow, 1991) or the Brooding and
Reflection subscales2 (all ps > 0.26). However, the two
groups did differ marginally in their age [behavioral sample:
t(53) = 1.93, p = 0.06; eye-tracking sample: t(49) = 1.78,
p = 0.08] and in years of education [behavioral sample:
t(53) = 2.38, p = 0.02; eye-tracking sample: t(49) = 1.83,
p = 0.07]. However, both differences were small in actual
magnitude, amounting to less than 1.5 years of age and one
semester of education.

We note that even though our primary interest was in whether
students without clinical depression might show evidence of
negatively biased attention when reminded of unmet academic
goals, many previous rumination induction studies find the
most adverse effects for individuals who are concurrently in a
depressive mood state (for a review, see Nolen-Hoeksema et al.,
2008). Thus, we assessed trait rumination and depression in
order to examine whether these individual difference factors
interacted with our state-level manipulations of attention. Past
studies have also suggested that gender may play a role in
defining the effects of rumination, in that women more than
men tend to ruminate over their affective state in the face of
negative outcomes and difficult life events (Nolen-Hoeksema and
Jackson, 2001; Mezulis et al., 2002; Johnson and Whisman, 2013).
Although past studies of rumination induction have not reported
effects of gender (e.g., Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995;
Lyubomirsky et al., 1998; Lyubomirsky et al., 2003), the particular
general knowledge task used in this study often demonstrates
stronger effects in women with regard to both manipulations of
context and individual difference variables compared to men (see
Whiteman and Mangels, 2016; Mangels et al., 2018; Abraham
et al., 2019). Therefore, we felt that restricting our sample to
women would provide the most robust test of our hypotheses,
even if it would limit the generalizability of the results.

Materials
General Knowledge Stimuli

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Stimuli consisted of 138 items from a larger, previously normed
pool of 406 general knowledge question and answer stimuli3 .
These were divided into two bins of 69 items for use in
each block of the general knowledge task. Bin order was
counterbalanced across blocks within each Induction condition.
Using information from the normed database, questions for

Participants
Fifty-nine women were recruited from the Baruch College
undergraduate population via the institution’s research
participation subject pool. They ranged in age from 18.0 to
34.2 years (M = 20.50, SEM = 0.40), self-reported being native
English speakers or fluent by age 6, had normal or correctedto-normal hearing and vision, and had no history of eye
disorders (e.g., detached or torn retina, macular degeneration,
glaucoma, color blindness). To limit our sample to students
without clinically significant depression, while still including
a representative range of participants, an additional inclusion
criterion was that they scored 19 or lower on the Beck Depression
Inventory II (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996). As compensation for
their participation, subjects received either research credit as
part of a course requirement (69.5%), monetary compensation
at a rate of $10/h (8.5%), or some combination of both credit
and money (22.0%).
Four participants were excluded from both the behavioral
and eye-tracking analyses (three Distraction conditions and
one Rumination condition) because they did not have enough
semantic error trials for analysis. In particular, two participants
self-terminated before Block 2, one participant performed 1.5
times the upper interquartile range of scores in the first two
blocks, and one participant was an outlier with regard to
orthographic errors (26%, as confirmed by a boxplot outlier
analysis)1 . Additionally, four more subjects (two from each

of 75–99%) were excluded because they would likely lead to different patterns
of eye movements (e.g., comparing letter for letter) than semantic errors. After
excluding the participant outlier, the rate of orthographic errors in the remaining
sample was very low (Rumination: M = 0.06, SEM = 0.006; Distraction: M = 0.06,
SEM = 0.006), and this proportion did not differ as a function of Induction
condition and/or Block (all ps > 0.11).
2
The preferred shortened form of the RRS was used, which has the Depression
subscale removed (Treynor et al., 2003).
3
www.mangelslab.org/bknorms

TABLE 1 | Sample characteristics with mean scores of pre-test self-report
questionnaires and demographics.
Behavioral sample
Variable

Orthographic errors (i.e., misspelled but otherwise semantically accurate
responses that overlapped orthographically with the correct answer to a degree

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

Distraction

Rumination

Distraction

28

27

26

25

Age

21.33 (0.72)

19.77 (0.34)

21.36 (0.78)

19.81 (0.36)

Years of education

13.94 (0.22)

13.22 (0.20)

13.86 (0.23)

13.28 (0.21)

BDI-II

6.64 (0.90)

8.33 (1.18)

6.69 (0.95)

7.84 (1.20)

RRS Total

39.57 (2.00)

42.78 (2.06)

40.07 (2.12)

42.60 (2.23)

Brooding

9.71 (0.71)

10.67 (0.67)

9.88 (0.75)

10.52 (0.71)

Reflection

9.46 (0.69)

9.22 (0.59)

9.54 (0.74)

9.24 (0.63)

n

1

Rumination

Eye-tracking sample

Standard errors of the mean appear in parentheses in this and all other tables.
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FIGURE 1 | Overview of study procedures. Please refer to section “Overview” for detailed explanation.

Following informed consent, subjects first filled out the
pre-task questionnaires, including the RRS, the BDI-II, and
a set of demographic questions. They were then escorted to
a well-lit room where they were seated comfortably, without
a chin rest or head constraints, approximately 60 cm in
front of the integrated Tobii computer monitor/eye tracker
system. A nine-point calibration procedure was carried out to
establish eye position.
Prior to Block 1, all subjects were presented with general
task instructions detailing the basic structure of a general
knowledge trial. Block 1, which served as the pre-induction
manipulation baseline, was subdivided into three 23-question
sets (for individual question trial structure, see section “Trial
Sequence”). Each question set was followed by a short survey
of the subjects’ subjective experiences during the preceding set
(see section “Post-set Surveys”), including the extent to which
they experienced recurrent negative thoughts (RNTs) and had
negative feelings after errors (FAEs).
After completing Block 1, subjects began Block 2, which
was defined as the post-induction manipulation period. This
block began with Condition-Specific Instructions (see section
“Condition-Specific Instructions”) regarding a writing-based
task where participants were prompted to retrieve from
autobiographical memory either an ongoing and unresolved
negative academic situation from their life (Rumination
condition) or a situation from a non-emotional, typical academic
day (Distraction condition). After identifying an appropriate
situation, they completed a pre-writing survey that queried the
degree of concerned thinking they had recently experienced
about their situation of focus. Then, they engaged in writing short
narrative responses (3–5 min) to a specific prompt (see section
“Induction-Related Writing Prompts”). This was followed by

each bin/block were matched for average difficulty (i.e., target
accuracy of 0.35). The length for all correct answer words was
pre-set to range from four to nine letters (Bin 1: M = 6.36,
SD = 1.16; Bin 2: M = 6.44, SD = 1.31), which typifies the
word length shown elsewhere to only require a single fixation
for effective lexical processing (Rayner, 1979, 1984). We also
ensured that all correct answer word stimuli had been rated
previously as being familiar to 95% of the Baruch College
undergraduate population, thus reducing the likelihood that
large variations in semantic word fluency would influence gaze
fixation behavior (Gernsbacher, 1984; Rayner and Duffy, 1986;
Shatzman and McQueen, 2006).

Software and Hardware
The general knowledge task was delivered using Presentation
software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Berkeley, CA)
and programmed to sync up and interface with Tobii
Studio Software (Version 2.3.1; Tobii Technology, Inc.,
Falls Church VA) in a dual-computer setup. In the testing
booth, the general knowledge stimuli were presented on a
2300 widescreen LCD monitor (1920 × 1080 screen resolution;
60 Hz refresh rate) that was part of a Tobii TX300 integrated
eye tracker system, which recorded gaze data at a sampling
rate of 300 Hz. Data were pre-processed using Tobii
Studio software and then exported and processed further in
Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA, United States) using an
in-house script.

Design and Procedure
Overview
The complete study procedure, from initial pre-task measures
through the final task block, are illustrated in Figure 1.

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org
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FIGURE 2 | Trial structure. Example shows a trial with an incorrect answer. If the subject’s answer had been correct (i.e., Manatee), a green circle and green correct
answer would have been shown, along with the correct answer in gray.

and subtending at about 17◦ VA. Whether the gray, task-given
correct answer appeared on the top of the screen or at bottom
on any given trial was pseudorandomly counterbalanced for
correct and incorrect trials separately, such that a given answer
type did not consecutively appear in the same location for more
than three trials.
Each word stimulus was 1.1 cm (∼1◦ VA) tall and could be as
wide as 9.9 cm (i.e., nine letters long, or ∼9◦ VA), but as narrow
as about 4.4 cm (i.e., four letters long, or 4◦ VA). This competitive
answer feedback was presented for 4 s, a duration consistent
with other eye-tracking studies using a competitive, free-viewing
stimulus design (Kellough et al., 2008; Duque et al., 2014; Owens
and Gibb, 2017). After offset of the competitive answer feedback,
an inter-stimulus interval ensued, consisting of a 3-s presentation
of a screen-centered gray circle, subtending 1◦ VA.

a rating of their post-writing subjective experiences about the
writing task itself. They then engaged in answering a set of 23
general knowledge questions. As in Block 1, each question set
was followed by the post-set survey of subjective experiences.
This sequence, from the writing sample to the post-set surveys,
was repeated for two more sets for a total of three sets (69
questions) in Block 2.

Trial Sequence
As shown in Figure 2, for each individual trial, questions
were presented in gray font on a black background. Subjects
had a 3-min time limit to submit their response, after
which they rated their response confidence on a scale
from 1 (sure wrong) to 4 (unsure) to 7 (sure right).
They were then presented with a short blank screen for
250 ms, followed by a 3-s fixation period, consisting of a
screen-centered gray circle that subtended 1◦ of visual angle
(VA). Then, an initial indicator of participants’ performance
accuracy was presented for 3 s, also consisting of another
centered circle, 1◦ VA in diameter, where the color red
indicated an error response and the color green indicated a
correct response.
Immediately after, the competitive answer feedback was
shown. The correct answer was always presented in gray, but
participants’ responses were presented in green if correct and
in red if incorrect. These two answers were presented in centerjustified, vertical alignment, separated by approximately 19.1 cm

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

Post-set Surveys
After each 23-item set of general knowledge questions, we asked
participants to rate the frequency of their RNTs and the relative
pleasantness of their FAEs. Each post-set survey question was
rated on a 1–9 Likert scale, with 1 reflecting the negative or low
end of the subjective experience, 9 reflecting the positive or high
end, and 5 indicating an experiential midpoint (i.e., neutrality).

Condition-Specific Instructions
Just prior to the onset of the induction manipulation in Block 2,
the following general statement was presented to all participants:

6
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For the Distraction condition, the prompts were fashioned
based on “fact control writing” often used in the expressive
writing literature (e.g., Seeley et al., 2017), where participants
write a factual account with little to no emotion of a recent
day in their schedule. Thus, the first prompt asked participants
to factually describe the events of a recent, non-emotional
day from their academic schedule. The second prompt asked
them to describe precisely when in the day (i.e., at what
exact time) the events they had previously described occurred.
Finally, the third prompt asked participants to describe precisely
where they were (i.e., at what exact spot on or around
campus) when the aforementioned events they had described
occurred (see Supplemental: Induction-Related Writing Prompts
for exact wording of prompts for both Rumination and
Distraction conditions).
The prompts in each condition were always presented in
the order mentioned above (i.e., no counterbalancing was
used), given that this particular sequence was deemed ideal for
creating a natural and continuous mental thread. To further
facilitate continuity, participants’ previous writing samples were
shown to them prior to completion of the next one. When
completing all writing prompts, participants were also asked
to constrain their focus to past-oriented thinking about their
situation. This was particularly important for the Rumination
condition because, although ruminating about past negative
events is commonly associated with concern for the future
(Watkins et al., 2015), such future-oriented, recurrent, and
repetitive negative thinking is more often described as being
a form of “worry” than rumination (Martin and Tesser, 1996;
Watkins, 2008).
After writing for each prompt, participants were asked to
fill out a short post-writing survey that queried their subjective
experiences while completing that particular writing sample. The
five items for the survey were selected from the “experiential
self-focus” rumination induction prompts originally developed
by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993) and adapted for
use in survey form. Using a scale that ranged from 1 to
9, with 1 reflecting an extreme amount of a given negative
self-focus characteristic (hopelessness, restlessness, sadness,
agitation, and fatigue), 9 reflecting an extreme amount of the
corresponding positive self-focus characteristic (e.g., hopefulness,
calmness, happiness, relaxation, and energy), and 5 indicating a
middle, neutral point.

“Based on your responses so far, you encountered some difficulty
answering the first block of questions. Although this difficulty is
happening within the context of this research study, perhaps you
have encountered difficulties in actual academic situations of your
own life. During real-life academic difficulties, many students often
report taking the time to. . ..”

This final phrase was completed by condition-specific
instructions to either “think about their academic difficulties
in real life” and identify an ongoing and unresolved academic
concern of theirs that had come about recently and was currently
causing them distress (Rumination Condition) or to “distract
themselves from the general knowledge questions or any real-life
academic difficulties” by identifying a recent non-emotional day
in their academic schedule for which they could remember with
good accuracy the events that took place (Distraction Condition).
To help participants with this process, they were supplied
with two condition-specific, scenario-based examples of suitable
situations of focus, described as being previously offered by actual
participants (see Supplemental: Condition-Specific Instructions for
the full set of condition-specific instructions and Supplemental:
Condition-Specific Examples for the condition-specific scenariobased examples).
Once participants identified their situation of focus for the
writing task, they briefly described it to the experimenter
who ensured it was suitable for their condition. If it was not
suitable, or they struggled to identify one at all, participants
were redirected with a few verbal prompts until they were
successful. Participants were then asked to complete a short,
condition-specific four-question pre-writing survey that queried
the degree of concerned thinking they had recently experienced
about their situation of focus on a 9-point Likert scale with
1 indicating low levels of concern and 9 indicating extreme
levels of concern (see Supplemental: Pre-Writing Survey for the
full set of items).

Induction-Related Writing Prompts
After a suitable situation had been identified, but prior to starting
each of three 23-item sets of questions in Block 2, participants
were presented with condition-specific prompts on how to craft
their writing samples.
For the Rumination condition, the writing prompts were
based on three important assumptions of Martin and Tesser’s
(1996) Control Theory of rumination. First, given their claim
that rumination is born out of goal-state discrepancies that are
persistent and revolve around a common instrumental theme,
the first prompt asked participants to factually describe with
as little emotional expression as possible what their ongoing
academic concern was and why it seemed to be persisting.
Second, given that rumination over unresolved goals can be
passive and automatic, the next prompt asked participants to
describe the kinds of recurrent and repetitive thoughts that
tended to easily come to mind about their ongoing academic
concern. Third, given that rumination comes online when the
rate of progress toward a goal is slower than what the individual
wants it to be, the final prompt asked participants to describe
the degree of investment of their time and energy that had been
expended in vain in attempts to resolve their concern.
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Data Analysis
ANCOVAs
We conducted a series of customized analyses of covariance
(ANCOVAs) that included the categorical factors of Induction
condition, Set (except on measures of eye-tracking due to trial
counts; see below), and Block (except on measures of the
writing exercise, which only occurred in Block 2), alongside
subjects’ continuous BDI-II scores and RRS Brooding and
Reflection scores as covariates (i.e., predictor variables). Although
parameter estimates were rendered for all three covariates,
including all interaction terms between each of the covariates
and manipulated variables, the ANCOVAs did not include
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FIGURE 3 | Competitive answer feedback AOIs and sample eye-tracking data. (A) Areas of interest (AOIs) are superimposed over each feedback type
(red = incorrect subject-given answer, gray = correct task-given answer, blue = initial central fixation area). (B) A short snippet (<1 s) of eye-tracking data from a
single subject is superimposed to illustrate fixations (red circles, where diameter is a function of duration) and saccades (thin red lines). During the task, the
participants were free to view the competitive answer feedback for a 4 s period.

interaction terms between Brooding, Reflection, and BDIII themselves, given that these trait/mood covariates were
included mainly to determine if state effects were present
even when controlling for these effects and/or they moderated
any observed state effects. Additionally, prior to entering eyetracking and subjective experience metrics into these ANCOVAs,
we partialed out any variance associated with differences
in performance accuracy on the general knowledge task in
order to control for differences in accuracy, given that basic
differences in error frequency could influence our key eyetracking metrics4 . This was done to increase the likelihood
that any observed differences in those variables were the
result of the induction and not individual differences in
general knowledge.
For all analyses, an alpha level of p < 0.05 was used as
criterion for significance, but marginally significant findings
(0.05 ≤ p < 0.10) regarding experimental manipulations are also
reported and explored because of a priori predictions with these
factors. On the other hand, marginal effects involving trait and
mood effects are only reported given that these analyses were
highly exploratory. Effect sizes are specified in all cases using
the partial eta squared statistic. Where necessary, Greenhouse–
Geisser corrections were used for violations of sphericity, and
where appropriate, linear trend analyses were conducted for
the three-level within-subjects factors of “Set” or “Prompt” to
especially explore how differences may have unfolded within the
post-induction period of the task. Any post hoc explorations of
significant main effects or interactions were carried out using

the Holm–Bonferroni procedure for corrections for multiple
comparisons (Holm, 1979).

Eye-Tracking
For each trial, a static, rectangular-shaped AOI with a width
of 14.1 cm (12.5◦ VA) and a height of 5.6 cm (5◦ VA) was
centered over each of the two pieces of word feedback for
the full duration of their presence on-screen (i.e., 4 s, see
Figure 3 for a pictorial representation of the AOIs used in
the current study). Since any one word stimulus itself was
1.1 cm (∼1◦ VA) tall, and could be as wide as 9.9 cm (i.e., nine
letters long, or ∼9◦ VA), the overlay of the AOI centrally on
top of the longest possible word stimuli (including participants’
typed responses) permitted a buffer of additional screen space
of 2.1 cm (i.e., ∼2◦ VA) from the outer borders of nine-letter
word stimuli out to the edge of the AOI in any direction.
These AOIs were used for the word stimuli for every trial,
regardless of word length.
AOIs with these kinds of parameters have been used elsewhere
in other studies investigating visual fixations of word stimuli
(Dampuré et al., 2014). Although seemingly conservative, these
AOI parameters were also chosen given that during normal
reading, the information necessary for making accurate semantic
assessments of fixated word stimuli is limited to foveal vision
(Rayner, 1979), and central foveal vision can subtend up to
5◦ VA (Duchowski, 2007). Given that Hansen and Ji (2010) report
the error rate for the accuracy of model-based gaze estimation
systems like that of the Tobii TX300 to be between 1◦ and 2◦ VA,
applying such conservative parameters for the two word feedback
AOIs in our study likely helped account for any degree of this
technical uncertainty.
Whether participants looked at the two pieces of word
feedback on any given trial (and for how long) was defined by
assessing the degree of gaze fixation (expressed in ms accrued)
that occurred within each of the two AOIs. In accord with
standard settings used on current Tobii eye trackers, fixations

4

We also considered whether it was necessary to include age or education as a
covariate in our analyses, due to some marginal differences in these participant
characteristics between Rumination and Distraction groups. We found that age
correlated with task accuracy in the total sample (r = -0.29, p < 0.05), but because
we had already partialed out variance due to differences in task accuracy in the
eye-tracking and post-task surveys, we did not feel that it was necessary to further
partial out variance due to age.
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prior to conducting the main eye-tracking analyses of interest,
we determined that we could simplify our statistical model by
collapsing across this factor because the number of useable trials
at each location did not interact with condition and/or block
(all ps > 0.26), and thus, any effect of location should influence
the Rumination and Distraction conditions equally. Although
there were no significant differences in the number of trials
across conditions (p > 0.91), there were significantly more trials
in both conditions that were retained in Block 1 (Rumination:
M = 31.5, SEM = 2.02; Distraction: M = 32.5, SEM = 2.06)
compared to Block 2 (Rumination: M = 29.7, SEM = 1.89;
Distraction: M = 28.1, SEM = 1.93), F(1, 49) = 7.43, p = 0.009,
ηp = 0.132.

were defined using the Velocity-Threshold Identification (I-VT)
fixation classification algorithm, where a velocity threshold of
any directional shift of the eye that was below 30 visual degrees
per second across data points was used to operationalize a single
fixation. To preserve the continuity of gaze data in momentary
instances (i.e., <75 ms) of signal loss, a gap fill-in interpolation
algorithm was applied, and any adjacent fixations found to be
within 0.5◦ VA of one another were merged. Any defined fixation
ultimately determined to be shorter than 60 ms in length was
re-classified as saccade data.
Any trial was excluded from analysis if gaze fixation was not
centered between the two feedback AOIs at the start of the trial in
a region 11.75 cm (10.5◦ VA) in height and 14.1 cm (12.5◦ VA)
in width (see Figure 3; left panel). We also excluded any trial
from analysis where the summation of available fixation time for
that trial was less than 2.67 ms (i.e., two thirds the duration of
competitive feedback presentation), or if that time was more than
2 SD below the participant’s mean summed-fixation time across
all trials (e.g., Chua et al., 2012). After these exclusions, if we had
retained set as a factor, there would have been 17 participants
excluded, and therefore we opted to collapse over this factor to
retain the maximal number of participants. Even after collapsing,
four subjects did not have a minimum of trials in all critical
conditions (as a function of answer type, answer location, and
task block), necessitating their exclusion from all further analyses.
Our measures of interest were FFD, defined as the time
spent looking at an answer AOI the first time it was
fixated upon, and TFD, defined as the overall time in ms,
summed across all fixations, spent looking at an answer
AOI. FFD and TFD values were generated for each of the
two AOIs in every single trial, after which single-subject
averages of each gaze fixation metric were calculated for
error trials as a function of answer type [subject-given
incorrect answer (red) vs. task-given correct answer (gray)],
task block (Block 1 or 2), and Induction condition (Rumination
or Distraction).
Only those error trials that represented semantic errors were
included for analysis, thereby excluding orthographic errors
(see Footnote 1) and correct trials. There were two reasons
why we did not include correct answers in our analyses.
First, in order to make the answer feedback for correct and
incorrect trials visually similar, feedback on a correct trial
had to include the correct answer in both positions on the
screen, with one in green and one in gray. As a result,
there was no meaningful competition for attention between
the two answers in terms of information, only in terms of
color. Thus, any looking-time differences to one of these correct
answers would be based purely on color and would not inform
our primary research questions. Second, the experiment was
purposefully designed to have more incorrect than correct trials
so that participants would experience challenge and difficulty
throughout the task. This gave us enough incorrect trials to
withstand some trial loss due to signal drop out, but too few
correct trials for analysis.
We also initially calculated FFD and TFD as a function of
Answer location (i.e., whether the gray, task-given correct answer
was presented at the top of the screen or at the bottom). However,
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RESULTS
Rumination and Distraction State
Inductions
Pre-writing Survey
Following identification of their condition-specific situation, but
before beginning their first writing sample, participants selfreported their degree of concern regarding the situation they
would be writing about. In line with expectations, identifying an
unresolved negative academic situation (Rumination condition)
generated more concern than identifying a non-emotional day in
one’s academic schedule (Distraction condition), F(1, 47) = 53.72,
p < 0.001, ηp 2 = 0.53 (see Figure 4A). Neither BDI-II nor RRS
subscores were associated with the strength of these ratings,
whether overall or via interaction with the Induction condition
factor (all ps > 0.38).

Writing Content Analysis
Participants’ three induction-related writing samples were rated
sentence by sentence for RB and SR writing content types
according to the coding system of Marin and Rotondo (2017).
Briefly, RB was any negative statement that described an
undesirable outcome/consequence, its cause, or any negative
evaluation. SR was any positive or neutral statement that
provided an evaluation/explanation about the self, others, or
the self–other relationship. Also included were statements that
provided constructive or insightful reasoning toward problemsolving or any adaptive action toward resolving one’s concerns.
Because one sentence could contain more than one phrase, each
one capturing a different idea, it was possible that one sentence
could be coded as containing both RB and SR content. However,
in cases where it was deemed that the participant wrote both RB
and SR content about the same idea in the same sentence, that
sentence was coded as only containing either RB or SR content,
based on whichever type was expressed as the concluding remark.
Upon the completion of coding, within any single writing sample,
the number of sentences containing RB and SR content were
each then separately summed and divided by the total number
of sentences written, thus rendering separate, but non-mutually
exclusive proportions for each rumination content type in that
writing sample. Additional details regarding this coding can be
found in Supplemental: Writing Content Analysis.
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FIGURE 4 | Writing task ratings. (A) Subjects’ average pre-writing ratings of the degree of concerned thinking (1 = low, 9 = high) regarding the situation of focus for
the writing-based task. Ratings are plotted as a function of Induction condition (Distraction in light gray; Rumination in dark gray). (B) The proportion of ruminative
writing content (Y -axis), whether in Ruminative Brooding (RB; solid lines) or Self-Reflection (SR; dotted lines) type, is plotted as a function of Induction condition
(Distraction in light gray; Rumination in dark gray) across each of the three Writing prompts during the post-induction period. (C) Subjects’ average post-writing
ratings of the valence of experiential self-focus (1 = extreme negative amount, 9 = extreme positive amount) during the writing-based task, as a function of Induction
condition and Writing prompt.

in the writing samples. The only significant finding associated
with trait Brooding was a main effect of increased ruminative
expression overall, regardless of Induction condition, Content
type, or Writing prompt, F(1, 47) = 9.65, p = 0.003, ηp 2 = 0.17.
However, for trait Reflection, a significant three-way interaction
emerged that included Induction condition and Writing prompt,
F(2, 94) = 4.27, p = 0.017, ηp 2 = 0.08. Specifically, trait Reflection
was associated with a significantly reduced amount of ruminative
expression (collapsed across ruminative Content type), but only
in the Rumination condition, and only after the third prompt,
β = −0.58, t = 3.88, p < 0.001, ηp 2 = 0.24. Although we found
a marginally significant three-way interaction involving pre-task
mood (i.e., BDI-II scores), Induction condition, and Writing
prompt, F(2, 94) = 2.55, p = 0.083, ηp 2 = 0.05, that also subsumed
a marginally significant two-way interaction involving BDI-II
and Writing prompt, F(2, 94) = 2.55, p = 0.083, ηp 2 = 0.05, these
will not be explored further (see section “ANCOVAs”).

An ANCOVA that included the categorical factors of
Induction condition, Rumination content type (RB vs. SR), and
Writing prompt (three prompts) alongside the continuous trait
covariates (see section “Data Analysis” above) demonstrated a
significant three-way interaction involving all categorical factors,
F(2, 94) = 3.63, p = 0.032, ηp 2 = 0.07, which subsumed
several significant two-way interactions [Induction condition
by Rumination content type: F(2, 94) = 29.09, p < 0.001,
ηp 2 = 0.38; Induction condition by Writing prompt: F(2,
94) = 3.18, p = 0.046, ηp 2 = 0.06; Rumination content type by
Writing prompt: F(2, 94) = 4.53, p = 0.013, ηp 2 = 0.09], as
well as main effects of Induction condition, F(1, 47) = 714.32,
p < 0.001, ηp 2 = 0.94, and Rumination content type, F(1,
47) = 27.91, p < 0.001, ηp 2 = 0.37. Below, we unpack the threeway interaction, whose results largely validate the effectiveness of
the induction manipulation in expected ways.
First, as shown in Figure 4B, RB content was significantly
greater for the Rumination condition compared to the
Distraction condition following all three writing prompts
(Prompt 1: p < 0.001; Prompt 2: p < 0.001; Prompt 3: p < 0.001).
On the other hand, although SR content was low and did
not differ between Rumination and Distraction conditions
following the first two prompts (ps > 0.53), by the third prompt,
participants in the Rumination condition included significantly
more SR in their writing than those in the Distraction condition
(p = 0.001). Indeed, following the third prompt, RB and SR rates
were not statistically different within the Rumination condition
after correcting for multiple comparisons (p = 0.54). This was
not due to a substantial decrease in RB content here compared to
the earlier two writing samples (all ps > 0.42 after correction),
but rather to an increase in SR content (Prompt 1 vs. 3: p = 0.003;
Prompt 2 vs. 3: p < 0.001).
Next, we evaluated the role that trait rumination and mood
state may have played in the expression of ruminative content
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Post-writing Ratings
An ANCOVA demonstrated a significant two-way interaction
effect between Induction condition and Writing prompt on
post-writing experiential self-focus, F(1.69, 79.32) = 7.79,
ε = 0.84, p < 0.001, ηp 2 = 0.14, which subsumed a
significant main effect of Induction condition, F(1,
47) = 8.47, p = 0.006, ηp 2 = 0.15. Post hoc tests of the twoway interaction revealed that only after the first writing
exercise did the Rumination group evidence significantly
more negative self-focus than the Distraction group (see
Figure 4C). However, there was an overall trend for
self-focus to move toward neutrality in both groups, as
was confirmed by exploration of a significant two-way
linear trend effect involving Induction condition and
Writing prompt, F(1, 47) = 9.87, p = 0.003, ηp 2 = 0.17.
Whereas those induced to ruminate reported experiencing
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self-focus that was initially “somewhat negative” but
then trended upward toward being more neutral, those
induced to distract initially reported self-focus that was
“somewhat positive” but then trended downward toward
neutrality. Thus, although those induced to ruminate
experienced more negative self-focus than those induced to
distract, this difference was only prominent earlier in the
post-induction period.
Turning to the possible influence of pre-task levels of RRS
and depression, we found a marginal three-way interaction
involving Induction condition, Writing prompt, and Brooding,
F(1.69, 79.32) = 3.30, ε = 0.84, p = 0.073, ηp 2 = 0.07,
and a significant two-way interaction effect involving trait
Reflection and Writing prompt, F(1.57, 79.32) = 5.71, ε = 0.84,
p = 0.019, ηp 2 = 0.11. Exploration of this latter significant
interaction yielded no significant parameter estimates (all
ps > 0.14). No effects involving pre-task BDI-II levels were found
(all ps > 0.55).

Recurring negative thoughts
In general, all participants reported experiencing a fairly low
frequency of RNTs (i.e., ratings of ∼3) across the general
knowledge task. When submitting RNTs to our customized
ANCOVA, we found a marginally significant two-way interaction
involving Induction condition and Block, F(1, 47) = 2.88,
p = 0.096, ηp 2 = 0.06, that subsumed a main effect of the Block
factor, F(1, 47) = 16.56, p < 0.001, ηp 2 = 0.26. Post hoc testing
of the two-way interaction revealed that in the Rumination
condition only, participants indicated having fewer RNTs in
Block 2 post-induction period than they did in the Block 1
pre-induction baseline (p = 0.001).
When considering RNT frequency in relation to pretask individual differences measures, however, both the
aforementioned two-way interaction and another two-way
interaction involving Induction condition and trait Reflection,
F(1, 47) = 6.43, p = 0.015, ηp 2 = 0.12, were qualified by a
significant three-way interaction involving all three factors, F(1,
47) = 4.39, p = 0.042, ηp 2 = 0.09. Post hoc testing of the three-way
interaction indicated a positive association between Reflection
and RNTs in Block 1 only and for women the Rumination
condition, β = 0.54, t = 2.93, p = 0.005, ηp 2 = 0.17. Trait
Brooding, on the other hand, was found to only interact with
Induction condition, F(1, 47) = 11.44, p = 0.001, ηp 2 = 0.09.
Brooding predicted significantly more RNTs across the entire
task for subjects, but only in the Distraction condition, β = 0.58,
t = 2.93, p = 0.007, ηp 2 = 0.15. Moreover, Brooding unexpectedly
predicted marginally fewer RNTs for those in the Rumination
condition, β = -0.37, t = 1.80, p = 0.084, ηp 2 = 0.06.

General Knowledge Task Performance
Task Accuracy
When we submitted task accuracy rates to our ANCOVA, no
main effects or interactions of Induction condition, Block,
or Set emerged (all ps > 0.18; see Table 2). Although
we did find a significant three-way interaction involving
Induction condition, Block, and trait Brooding, F(1,
47) = 4.99, p = 0.030, ηp 2 = 0.10, as well as Induction
condition, Block, and BDI-II, F(1, 47) = 4.12, p = 0.048,
ηp 2 = 0.08, none of the post hoc comparisons associated with
these interactions survived Holm–Bonferroni corrections
(all ps > 0.24).

Feelings after errors
Table 2 also shows that all participants generally reported feeling
“somewhat unpleasant” (i.e., ratings of ∼4) after making an
error during the general knowledge task. When submitting
these subjective experience ratings to our customized ANCOVA,
however, we found no effects of Induction condition. Rather,
we found a significant main effect of Set, F(2, 94) = 6.08,
p = 0.003, ηp 2 = 0.11, such that, compared to Set 1 ratings, all

Post-set Thoughts and Feelings
Table 2 also shows the mean ratings of RNTs and
FAEs that participants reported experiencing during the
general knowledge task.

TABLE 2 | Task accuracy and ratings of task-related recurring negative thoughts (RNTs) and feelings after errors (FAEs), as a function of Induction condition and Block
and Set.
Block 1 (pre-induction baseline)
Variable

Condition

Set 1

Block 2 (post-induction period)

Set 2

Set 3

Set 1

Set 2

Set 3

Accuracy
Rumination

0.323 (0.022)

0.280 (0.028)

0.280 (0.024)

0.290 (0.023)

0.300 (0.021)

0.300 (0.024)

Distraction

0.325 (0.023)

0.347 (0.029)

0.307 (0.024)

0.318 (0.023)

0.345 (0.022)

0.310 (0.024)

RNTs
Rumination

3.80 (0.36)

3.93 (0.36)

4.19 (0.37)

2.90 (0.35)

2.81 (0.38)

2.76 (0.37)

Distraction

4.05 (0.37)

4.05 (0.36)

3.56 (0.38)

3.63 (0.36)

3.37 (0.38)

3.23 (0.37)

FAEs
Rumination

4.09 (0.24)

3.62 (0.26)

3.44 (0.28)

4.20 (0.23)

3.91 (0.27)

3.92 (0.23)

Distraction

3.76 (0.25)

3.45 (0.27)

3.42 (0.29)

3.78 (0.24)

3.54 (0.27)

3.95 (0.23)

All means are adjusted for BDI-II, Brooding, and Reflection covariates; RNTs and FAEs are also adjusted for task accuracy. Recurring Negative Thoughts (RNTs) were
rated on a scale of 1 (none at all) to 9 (an extreme amount), with 5 representing a moderate amount. Feelings After Errors (FAEs) were rated on a scale of 1 (extremely
unpleasant) to 9 (extremely pleasant), with 5 representing neither pleasant nor unpleasant.

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

11

September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 2094

Whiteman and Mangels

Rumination and Attention to Feedback

participants reported feeling more unpleasant after errors in Set
2 (p < 0.005) and Set 3 (p < 0.05), regardless of task block.
There was also a marginal main effect of Block, F(1, 47) = 2.96,
p = 0.092, ηp 2 = 0.06, which was led by participants reporting
numerically more unpleasant feelings in Block 2 compared to
Block 1, regardless of question set. With regard to the influence
of trait and mood factors, we found only a significant main effect
of trait Brooding, F(1, 47) = 5.59, p = 0.022, ηp 2 = 0.11, where
those higher in this trait tendency had worse feelings about errors,
regardless of condition or set. There was also a marginal main
effect of BDI-II, F(1, 47) = 3.20, p = 0.080, ηp 2 = 0.06, but this will
not be explored further.

TABLE 3 | Average gaze fixation durations (in seconds) during error trials.

Relationship between writing content and post-set thoughts
and feelings

TFD

Variable

Condition

Pre-induction
baseline

Post-induction
period

Rumination

0.310 (0.024)

0.301 (0.028)

Distraction

0.265 (0.024)

0.356 (0.029)

Rumination

0.185 (0.012)

0.207 (0.011)

Distraction

0.201 (0.012)

0.199 (0.011)

Rumination

1.778 (0.073)

1.656 (0.082)

Distraction

1.775 (0.075)

1.752 (0.084)

Rumination

0.846 (0.051)

0.868 (0.052)

Distraction

0.838 (0.053)

0.804 (0.053)

FFD
Correct
answer

Incorrect
answer

Correct
answer

The rumination induction technique introduced in Block 2 was
designed to activate brooding thoughts that would potentially
carry over into participants’ subjective experience during the
general knowledge task itself. To test for such a relationship, we
examined the extent to which the proportion of RB content in
the Rumination condition writing samples5 correlated with RNTs
or FAEs, as a function of set. In support of the effectiveness
of the induction, we observed a significant inverse relationship
between proportion of RB content and FAEs during Set 2,
r(27) = -0.575, p < 0.001, which is when negative FAEs peaked
for all participants, regardless of condition. Thus, the degree
to which participants were able to access and to express RB
during the writing exercise was related to greater negative
feelings about their mistakes, at least at a point in the task
when those negative feelings were more likely to be salient for
all participants. Interestingly, the proportion of self-reflective
content (SR) in their writing was positively related to FAEs,
r(27) = 0.606 = p < 0.001, consistent with a buffering effect
of this more adaptive type of rumination on negative affect.
These significant relationships between writing content and FAEs
were maintained even when controlling for trait differences in
Brooding and Reflection [correlation with RB: r(24) = -0.567,
p = 0.002; correlation with SR: r(24) = 0.615, p < 0.001]. No
significant relationships with FAEs were found during the other
sets (all ps > 0.20) and no significant relationships were found for
RNTs in any set (all ps > 0.13).

Incorrect
answer

FFD, First Fixation Duration; TFD, Total Fixation Duration.

p = 0.083, ηp 2 = 0.07; Induction condition by Block: F(1,
43) = 3.50, p = 0.068, ηp 2 = 0.08], as well as significant main
effects of Block, F(1, 43) = 6.68, p = 0.013, ηp 2 = 0.13, and Answer
type, F(1, 43) = 49.26, p < 0.001, ηp 2 = 0.53. We also observed
a marginally significant main effect of trait Brooding on FFDs in
this analysis, F(1, 43) = 3.83, p = 0.056, ηp 2 = 0.08, that will not
be explored further.
With regard to the main effect of Answer type, participants’
FFDs on the correct answer word were longer (M = 0.308,
SEM = 0.017) than they were on reminders about their incorrect
response (M = 0.198, SEM = 0.007), a relatively large difference
that can be seen in the top half of Table 3. Due to this large overall
difference, we will unpack the significant three-way interaction
using a simple effects approach after first splitting by Answer type
and conducting separate two-way mixed-measures ANCOVAs on
FFDs to the subject-entered incorrect answer and FFDs to the
task-provided correct answer.
When assessing FFDs on the incorrect response only, we
found only a marginally significant two-way interaction between
Induction condition and Block, F(1, 43) = 2.89, p = 0.096,
ηp 2 = 0.06. Consistent with predictions, exploration of this
interaction indicated that within the Rumination condition, FFDs
on reminders of recent performance failures were longer during
the post-induction period (i.e., Block 2) than they were during
the pre-induction baseline (i.e., Block 1), although this effect did
not survive post hoc Holm–Bonferroni corrections for multiple
comparisons (uncorrected p < 0.05). In contrast, this same
block-based comparison within the Distraction condition did
not approach significance, nor did either of the condition-based
comparisons within each block (all ps > 0.33).
In contrast, when assessing FFDs on the correct answer, we
found a significant Induction condition by Block interaction,
F(1, 43) = 8.30, p = 0.006, ηp 2 = 0.16, which also subsumed

Eye-Tracking Metrics
Table 3 shows the average duration of first fixation and
total fixation to both types of competitive answer feedback
(i.e., task-given correct answer and subject-given answer)
during error trials.

First Fixation Duration
An ANCOVA that included Induction condition, Block, and
Answer type, along with the continuous RRS and mood
variables, revealed a significant three-way interaction, involving
all categorical factors, F(1, 43) = 12.31, p = 0.001, ηp 2 = 0.22. This
higher-order interaction subsumed two marginally significant
two-way interactions [Answer type by Block: F(1, 43) = 3.15,
5

Floor effects on the levels of RB and SR in the Distraction condition precluded a
corresponding analysis for that induction condition.
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only (i.e., Block 1), Brooding surprisingly predicted significantly
longer TFDs on the correct answer feedback type, regardless of
Induction condition, β = 0.50, t = 3.40, p = 0.001, ηp 2 = 0.20. No
parameter estimates involving the relationship of Brooding with
TFDs on reminders of participants’ incorrect responses in either
Block 1 or Block 2 were significant (all ps > 0.27).
We also observed a significant three-way interaction involving
Answer type, Block, and trait Reflection, F(1, 43) = 4.37, p = 0.43,
ηp 2 = 0.09. Post hoc examination of parameter estimates again
revealed an effect involving only the correct answer feedback
type, and only within the pre-induction baseline (i.e., Block 1).
However, this particular trait style of ruminative responsiveness
surprisingly predicted significantly shorter TFDs to this novel
corrective information for all subjects, β = −0.41, t = 2.89,
p = 0.006, ηp 2 = 0.15. No parameter estimates involving
the relationship of Reflection with TFDs on reminders of
participants’ incorrect responses in either Block 1 or Block 2 were
significant (all ps > 0.39). Finally, in contrast to the significant
moderation of TFD effects by both trait RRS subtypes, pretask BDI-II scores exhibited only a marginal interaction with
Induction condition and Block, F(1, 43) = 2.87, p = 0.097,
ηp 2 = 0.06, that will not be discussed further.

FIGURE 5 | Pre-to-post induction differences in First Fixation Duration (FFD).
Changes in FFD between the pre-induction baseline (i.e., Block 1) and
post-induction period (i.e., Block 2) are plotted as difference scores (i.e., Block
2 FFD - Block 1 FFD). Difference scores are plotted as a function of Induction
condition (Distraction in light gray; Rumination in dark gray) and Answer type
(i.e., correct gray answer and incorrect red answer).

DISCUSSION
a main effect of Block, F(1, 43) = 5.74, p = 0.021, ηp 2 = 0.12.
Specifically, among those in the Distraction condition, FFDs
on the correct answer were significantly longer during the
post-induction period than they were during the pre-induction
baseline (p < 0.005). This same block-based comparison within
the Rumination condition was not significant, nor were any of the
condition-based comparisons within each block (all ps > 0.18).
Figure 5 illustrates the contrasting pre-post induction differences
of the Rumination and Distraction conditions on both the correct
answer compared to the reminder of the incorrect answer.

In the context of a challenging general knowledge retrieval task
(see also Butterfield and Mangels, 2003; Whiteman and Mangels,
2016), the present study asked whether women induced into
a state of rumination or distraction would allocate attention
differently to reminders of their retrieval mistakes (i.e., incorrect
answer) vs. new information (i.e., the correct answer), as
measured by two metrics of gaze fixation duration – FFD and
TFD. Both the rumination and distraction induction procedures
involved completing handwritten narratives contextualized to
be academically relevant. However, whereas the Distraction
condition involved retrieval of the non-emotional details in the
schedule of an average school day, the Rumination condition
involved retrieval of details about an unresolved academic
concern. On both our experimenter-quantified (i.e., writing
content) and subjective self-report (i.e., post-writing experiential
self-focus) measures, our findings support the conclusion that
the women in this study carried out the writing exercises
in induction-congruent ways, both replicating and extending
previous studies (e.g., Roberts et al., 2013; Marin and Rotondo,
2017). Thus, we can be reasonably confident that our taskrelated findings can be interpreted from the assumption that
participants had been successfully induced into states of either
rumination or distraction.
Before discussing those task-related effects in detail, we
first expand on the similarity between the pattern of RB and
SR in our writing samples and those of Marin and Rotondo
(2017), who examined ruminative content in 15 min writing
samples taken once a day over 3 days. In Marin and Rotondo
(2017), participants instructed to write about a recent, stressful
experience maintained a relatively high degree of focus on the
causes of that experience and related negative evaluations (i.e.,

Total Fixation Duration
For this gaze metric, we found only a significant main effect of
Answer type, F(1, 43) = 185.32, p < 0.001, ηp 2 = 0.81, indicating
that all participants’ TFDs on the correct answer were much
longer (M = 1.740, SEM = 0.053) than their TFDs on reminders
about their incorrect response (M = 0.839, SEM = 0.035), and
a significant main effect of Block, F(1, 43) = 6.05, p = 0.018,
ηp 2 = 0.12, where TFDs observed in the post-induction period
were shorter (M = 1.270, SEM = 0.033) than those seen in the
pre-induction baseline (M = 1.309, SEM = 0.029). There were
no overall differences or interactions involving the Induction
condition factor (all ps > 0.15).
Interestingly, trait RRS predicted TFD, regardless of Induction
condition. In particular, we observed a significant three-way
interaction involving Answer Type, Block, and trait Brooding,
F(1, 43) = 7.89, p = 0.007, ηp 2 = 0.16, which subsumed both a
main effect of Brooding, F(1, 43) = 6.08, p = 0.018, ηp 2 = 0.12,
and a two-way interaction involving Answer type and Brooding,
F(1, 43) = 5.92, p = 0.019, ηp 2 = 0.12. Unpacking the threeway interaction, we found that within the pre-induction baseline
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The difference in information value between these two stimuli
may have been sufficient to reduce the strength of any attentional
biases toward their reminder of their error. Indeed, FFDs to
reminders of recent performance failures were two-thirds the
duration they spent fixating the novel corrective information,
which is not surprising given the sensitivity of eye-tracking
measures to word frequency and other lexical/semantic features
(e.g., Reichle et al., 2003; Staub et al., 2010). Future studies where
the competitive answer feedback represents the first time that
participants learn of their response’s accuracy (i.e., eliminating
the initial red or green circle indicating accuracy) may increase
the sensitivity of our general knowledge task to such attentionalbias predictions by making sure the participant’s incorrect answer
and the task-provided correct answer both provide new, although
qualitatively different, information.
The effect of state rumination on FFDs to reminders of the
participants’ errors may also have been stronger if we had been
able to separately analyze FFDs associated with each set of
questions in the post-induction period, rather than having to
collapse across the three sets to achieve sufficient trial counts.
Indeed, our measures of subjective experiences suggest that the
rumination induction may have had a stronger influence on the
first two sets compared to the third. Specifically, after the first
writing exercise, we observed the largest differential between
the Rumination and Distraction conditions on post-writing
negative experiential self-focus. Although on that particular
measure there was a regression toward neutral ratings for
both Induction conditions after the second and third writing
exercises, in the second set, a stronger relationship between
the ruminative writing content and subjective task experiences
emerged. Specifically, in this set, the participants in the
Rumination condition who included more RB content in their
writing sample also reported greater negative feelings about their
task-related errors (FAEs). Interestingly, it was during this set of
trials that FAEs appeared to be heightened for all participants,
regardless of Induction condition (or block), suggesting that
carryover from the writing exercise was greatest at a point in
the task when the negative impact of repeated failure became the
most salient. However, even though FAEs in the third and final
set remained more negative overall, relative to the first set, the
writing samples in the Rumination condition at this point in the
post-induction period changed to include more of a putatively
“adaptive” form of rumination—SR. Given evidence that SR in
the writing exercise could reduce the sting of negative feedback
(i.e., positive correlation with FAEs in Set 2), it is possible that by
the third set, any selective attentional bias toward the reminder
of the incorrect response in the Rumination condition, similarly,
may have been mitigated by these adaptive influences.
Alternatively, the effects of rumination on feedback may
simply be better explained by the inability to disengage from
internally focused attention to the goal-based appraisal of
the negative feedback rather than by overt attention to the
external feedback itself. For example, in an event-related potential
(ERP) study of trait rumination that used a similar general
knowledge retrieval paradigm as in the current study (Whiteman
and Mangels, 2016), we found that women higher in trait
Brooding demonstrated evidence of more sustained attention

RB) across the 3 days, with greater degrees of expression of
this maladaptive form of rumination being associated with more
negative self-focus and lower self-acceptance. However, by their
third writing sample, participants also evidenced an increased
degree of positive evaluation about their circumstances (i.e., SR).
Both patterns are similar to that found in the present study and
stand in contrast to studies where expressive writing has been
found to be more beneficial for mood and behavior (e.g., Gortner
et al., 2006; Sloan et al., 2008; Ramirez and Beilock, 2011). In
particular, our prompts, which were aligned specifically with
components of Martin and Tesser’s (1996) socio-cognitive theory
of rumination, appeared to keep women brooding over their
unresolved issues as they sequentially described their concern,
the thoughts associated with it, and the time and energy they
had spent unsuccessfully trying to resolve it. Only after the third
time they had written about their unresolved situation were
the women able to introduce more active reflection on how
to move beyond it.
Despite the apparent effectiveness of the induction procedure,
we did not find robust evidence for our hypothesis that being
induced to ruminate versus distract increased attention to
reminders about one’s errors. Although there was some evidence
from planned comparisons that women in the Rumination
condition increased their FFDs to the incorrect answer after the
induction, this effect was not strong enough to survive correction
for multiple comparisons. No other gaze duration effects
specific to state Rumination were found. Thus, these findings
provide weaker support than expected for both the impaired
disengagement (Koster et al., 2011) and attentional scope theories
of rumination (Whitmer and Gotlib, 2013). However, this may be
related in part to the type of information presented. Past studies
have primarily utilized passive viewing of negative faces or selfrelevant words [e.g., passive viewing of emotional faces with no
explicit task-based instruction (Duque and Vázquez, 2015; Owens
and Gibb, 2017) and passive viewing of emotional or self-focused
words in a simple target discrimination task (Grol et al., 2015;
Southworth et al., 2017)].
Although we presented the incorrect answer in red, a color
that some studies have shown to be implicitly arousing and
negative (Elliot et al., 2007, 2009), the words themselves were
not intrinsically negative. Instead, it was the internal construal of
the meaning of this feedback in reference to achievement-related
goals that might generate ruminative thoughts, something that
may not be captured by gaze fixation. Gaze fixation metrics can
only speak to where and how long the eyes dwell on the screen,
but do not necessarily speak to what individuals are focusing on
internally. Although models of eye movements and attention are
often based on the principle that where one is looking is what
one is thinking about (e.g., Just and Carpenter, 1976), at any
given moment, the object(s) of internal and external focus can be
different (Hunt and Kingstone, 2003), such as has been shown in
the eye-tracking patterns of individuals who are mind wandering
(Reichle et al., 2010).
Additionally, in our general knowledge task, participants had
a choice between processing feedback information they already
knew (i.e., that they had made a mistake) or updating their
already existing knowledge by attending to the correct answer.
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in this regard. Although a reliable decrease in FFD to the
correct answer during the post-induction period would have
given stronger evidence for this interpretation, we can at least
conclude that the Rumination condition did not increase overt
attention to the correct answer in the manner observed in the
Distraction condition.
Finally, turning to our exploration of whether pre-task levels
of trait Brooding and/or Reflection might influence subjective
and objective measures within the task, we found a number
of interesting findings. First and not unexpectedly, during the
writing exercises, women who already had a trait tendency
toward Brooding were more likely to describe their situation with
phrases labeled as RB, regardless of whether they were writing
about an unresolved academic issue or a neutral day. These
findings are similar to those of Roberts et al. (2013), who also
found that trait Brooding predicted significantly more reports
of ruminative thoughts in their state Rumination condition. In
contrast, a trait tendency to reflect seemed to buffer against
the particular high levels of brooding content found in the
Rumination condition, at least by the third time participants
engaged in writing about their situation, which is when SR
content increased for all women in the Rumination condition.
Thus, when engaged in retrieval of autobiographical episodes,
trait Brooding and Reflection tendencies appeared to either
augment or buffer the expression of the more negative, moody
brooding content in their writing samples, respectively.
Second, to the extent that trait RRS significantly affected gaze
duration, it did so only for TFDs, and only in the pre-induction
baseline, before any of the state effects described above unfolded.
However, somewhat counterintuitively, Brooding predicted
increased TFDs to corrective feedback, whereas Reflection
predicted decreased TFDs to this information in that initial block.
Unlike FFDs, however, which support initial lexical and semantic
processing of the answers (Reichle et al., 2003; Staub et al., 2010),
interpretation of TFDs in this task are less straightforward. There
are multiple reasons why women might return to the correct
answer component of the competitive feedback after fixations
elsewhere. For example, the longer TFDs associated with greater
trait Brooding might represent multiple short gaze fixations as
they go back and forth from other areas of the screen, periodically
reminding themselves of the correct answer, or a more sustained
return to the correct answer as internal thoughts wander to taskrelevant thoughts (i.e., “Why didn’t I put that answer?”) or even
task-irrelevant thoughts (e.g., Reichle et al., 2010).
In contrast, consistent with the general association of trait
Reflection with the desire to “take space” from one’s issues in
order to proactively self-reflect (Treynor et al., 2003), the shorter
TFDs associated with this particular RRS subcomponent could
represent looking elsewhere on-screen (i.e., blank space, center
of the screen in active preparation of the next question) once
the correct answer had been initially processed. Unfortunately,
the self-reports of RNTs do not provide much insight here, as
they yielded state and trait rumination effects that were complex
and difficult to interpret, possibly because RNTs had very low
frequencies regardless of either condition or block. Whatever the
reason for the opposing effects of trait Brooding and Reflection,
however, the lack of interaction between trait RRS and state

to negative feedback, particularly as the task progressed and
errors accumulated, as indexed by the magnitude and duration
of a late positive potential (LPP) waveform over posterior scalp
regions. Notably, the LPP is a putative ERP index of motivated
attention to a visually evocative stimulus (Schupp et al., 2004;
Foti and Hajcak, 2008) but can continue to be modulated by
internal representations of emotional stimuli sustained even after
stimulus offset (Hajcak and Olvet, 2008).
Additionally, one future way to evaluate this hypothesis using
eye-tracking methodology would be to examine pupil dilation
to the initial, centrally presented negative feedback (i.e., the red
circle). Pupil dilation can provide an index of noradrenergically
mediated arousal and internal processing effort (e.g., Eckstein
et al., 2017), and previous studies have found increases in the
extent and duration of pupil dilation to emotionally relevant
information in relation to rumination (e.g., Siegle et al., 2003;
Duque et al., 2014). For the present study, however, our interest
was not in arousal, but in whether the induction of rumination
would bias attention toward reminders of the mistake, rather
than toward new information through which participants could
correct their errors. For this question, we felt that gaze duration
was a more appropriate measure. Additionally, when setting up
our experiment, we found that the bright lighting conditions
necessary to optimize gaze tracking made it difficult to optimally
record pupillometry, which required dimmer lighting to allow for
an appropriate range of pupillary responses. Given our primary
interest was in selective attention to competitive feedback, we
optimized our lighting for gaze tracking, precluding analysis
of pupil activity.
Although our measures of gaze dwell time did not yield
strong evidence for increased overt attention to reminders of
errors in the Rumination condition, the Distraction condition
reliably led to an increased FFD to the correct answer feedback
type compared to the pre-induction baseline (i.e., Block 1). One
interpretation of this finding is that writing about a neutral school
day distracted the women away from any academic concerns
existing either inside or outside of the task, leaving greater
resources to attend to new information following errors. This
increase in FFD on the correct answer could also reflect a
general increase in intrinsic curiosity about this information,
motivated by an interest in integrating this information into their
existing knowledge base (cf. Kang et al., 2009). Thus, from a
mechanistic perspective, distraction may therefore serve as an
adaptive emotion regulation strategy (e.g., McRae et al., 2010),
helping to down-regulate negative affect and redirect attention
onto actions or objects of thought that are external to the self.
In comparison, the lack of similar findings in the Rumination
condition could be another symptom of a less adaptive attentional
focus. Indeed, some related work that used gaze fixation to index
motivation toward attainment of a personally relevant goal found
that individuals looked less at a goal-related stimulus if they
believed the goal reflected by that stimulus was unattainable
(Light and Isaacowitz, 2006). By this view, the instruction to
ruminate about an unresolved academic concern may have
primed women in our study to believe that an effort to resolve
their poor performance was fruitless, and thus, any sustained
overt attention to the correct answer would not be useful
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with our current results, it would suggest that rumination
could lead to better memory for one’s own mistakes whereas
distraction would lead to better correction of those mistakes.
We also acknowledge that our current findings are limited to
a female sample, leaving open the question of how men would
respond to our writing-based induction. Addressing these open
issues would be valuable given the implications for developing
interventions for students who, when facing significant academic
difficulties, may experience states of rumination that interfere
with optimal attention to learning resources needed to reach
their academic goals.

condition during the post-induction period suggests that, at
least in this sample, effortful attempts to complete the written
Rumination and Distraction narratives may have temporarily
dominated the influence of trait tendencies on overt measures of
attention in this task.

CONCLUSION
Throughout college, many students will experience some type
of impediment to attaining their academic goals, making them
vulnerable to recurrent and self-focused thoughts as they try
to minimize and resolve goal-state discrepancies. Theorists in
both cognitive and clinical domains have identified a tendency
to habitually ruminate in response to personal challenges and
negative mood states as being integral to the development of
depression, especially for women (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987;
Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow, 1991; Watkins and Teasdale,
2001). Here, we demonstrated that even the simple process of
being reminded of and writing about one of these unresolved
academic situations was sufficient to at least temporarily increase
otherwise mentally healthy women’s negative self-focus (e.g.,
greater endorsement of hopelessness), compared to writing
about a neutral school day. Furthermore, although the ability
of the induction to elicit RB writing content was related to
trait rumination, the state induction itself appeared sufficient to
override any influence of these trait tendencies on behavior, and
least in this female sample that was not clinically depressed.
In our academically relevant general knowledge retrieval
task, we found some evidence (from planned comparisons)
for consequences of the Rumination condition in the form of
increased initial dwell time (FFD) on reminders of their past
mistakes, coupled with even stronger evidence for the benefits
of the Distraction condition for increasing initial dwell time
on potentially corrective information (see also Figure 5). Taken
together, these findings provide not only some support for
predictions from attentional theories of rumination predicting
an exaggerated focus on negative, self-relevant information
(Koster et al., 2011; Whitmer and Gotlib, 2013) but also the
view that distraction can be a beneficial method of emotion
regulation in the face of failure (cf. Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008;
McRae et al., 2010). Even though both differences amounted
to fractions of a second in gaze duration, these differences
could still have implications for downstream learning, given
that ERP studies using a variant of this general knowledge task
have shown neural differences predicting successful encoding
of correct answers starting as early as 300 ms after word onset
(i.e., Butterfield and Mangels, 2003).
Despite intriguing results from this first-known study testing
the influence of state rumination on the differential allocation
of overt attention to feedback following failures, we have
already described a number of ways in which future studies
could improve study sensitivity. The functional relationship
between differences in dwell time and error correction in this
task is also important to establish. In at least one intentional
encoding experiment, longer dwell time (as indexed by both
FFD and TFD metrics) predicted greater subsequent recognition
of verbal stimuli (Pazzaglia et al., 2014). Taken together
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org
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